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Constitutional Law
LEGAL AUTHORITY TO PROPOSE CONSTRUCTION OR ACQUISI-
TION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES BY INITIATIVE PETITION-
APPLICABILITY OF SEC 10216, GENERAL CODE-EQUITY
-FORM OF INJUNCTION
The Ohio Power Company brought this action for an injunction
seeking to restrain the Board of Elections of Columbiana County from
submitting to the electors of the City of East Liverpool, a proposed
initiative ordinance for the purchase or construction of a municipal
power plant. The plaintiff in its petition alleged and the demurrer
thereto admitted that the initiative petition was filed with the City Audi-
tor on Thursday, September 13, 1934; that at 9:45 A. M. on Mon-
day, September 24, 1934, the City Auditor certified the petition to the
Board of Elections; and that at I:00 A. M. on the same day, the
Ohio Power Company attempted to inspect the petition in the office of
the City Auditor in order to complete a check it was making as to the
authenticity and validity of the signatures thereto, and was at that time
informed of the previous certification of the petition to the Board
of Elecions.
The plaintiff founded its application for injunction on two theories:
first, that the electors of the City of East Liverpool have no legal author-
ity to propose this ordinance by an initiative petition (a constitutional
question); second, that the City Auditor certified the petition to the
Board of Elections of Columbiana County before the expiration of the
time stipulated by the statutes of Ohio.
The trial court denied the Ohio Power Company's prayer for
relief, but on appeal of the cause, the Court of Appeals of Columbiana
County rendered a decree whereby the Board of Elections was in abso-
lute terms enjoined from submittting the initiative petition to a vote of
the people. Although the Court of Appeals in its opinion accepted both
of the plaintiff's contentions in support of the decree, the Supreme Court
of Ohio affirmed the decree on the basis of the second contention of the
plaintiff when it held that no constitutional question was involved. Ohio
Power Co. v. Davidson, 128 Ohio St. 614, 192 N.E. 882 (October
24, 1934).
Since the Supreme Court predicated its holding on the basis of the
plaintiff's second contention (thus eliminating any necessity for ren-
dering an opinion as to the constitutional question presented), the second
contention will here be discussed first.
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The proposition that the injunction should issue because the City
Auditor certified the initiative before the time permitted by law, involves
the conjunctive interpretation of Section 4227-I and 4227-8, Ohio
General Code (Municipal Initiative and Referendum Act) along with
Section 1o216 of the Ohio General Code. Section 4227-8 prdvides;
"... after a petition has been filed with the City Auditor... it shall be
kept open for public inspection for ten days . . ." It is stipulated in
Section 4227-I that ".... said City Auditor shall after ten days, certify
the petition to the Board of State Deputy Supervisors of Elections ..."
Section 10216 of the General Code states: "Unless otherwise specifically
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done
shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last;
except that the last shall be excluded if it be Sunday."
There is considerable authority in support of the conclusion of both
the Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court to the effect that Section
i0216 is applicable to cases where the act is to be done after as well as
within a stated period of time and therefore that this section should be
applied to the situation presented in the principal case.
This section has been liberally construed so as to be applicable to all
cases involving the computation of time in so far as it is legally possible
to apply the provisions of that statute. Although the statute specifically
states that its terms are to be applied where "an act is required by law
to be done, it has been interpreted to include acts permitted by law to be
done." State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St. 489, 83 N.E. 904 (19o8). It
was held in the same case that the statute was to be applied to criminal
as well as to civil cases involving the computation of time.
In Neiswander v. Brickner, 116 Ohio St. 249, 156 N.E. 138
(1927), Section 10216 was interpreted t; be applicable to all acts per-
mitted or required by law to be done and is not restricted in application
to Part Third of the Ohio General Code in which Part this statute is
set out.
The spirit with which this statute has been construed is clearly
deducible from the following excerpt from the opinion of the court
in State v. Elson, (supra): "The mode of computing time in any par-
ticular case or class of cases is of far less importance than that there
should be some established and uniform rule on the subject. Obviously
it is not for the public good nor in the interest of the due administration
of justice that there should be two rules or that the rule should be
different or less certain in criminal than it is in civil cases. In our opinion
this rule of the statute should be followed and applied in the interpreta-
tion and construction of all statutes, save those where the language of the
provision as to time, itself clearly forbids it."
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Even though the provisions of Section 10216 be interpreted as
applicable to the facts of the principal case, and conceding that the City
Auditor of East Liverpool exceeded his authority in certifying the initia-
tive to the Board of Elections before midnight of Monday, September
24, 1934, it does not of necessity follow that the injunction should issue
in the absolute form in which it was decreed. Would not the interests
of all the parties involved in this case have been better conserved by
enjoining the defendants from placing the petition on the ballots until
the plaintiff was given an opportunity to examine the petition for a
period of time equivalenf to that which they were illegally deprived of
examination? An injunction rendered in this conditional form would
restore to the plaintiff the benefits intended to be bestowed on it under
the provisions of Section 1O216, and at the same time signers of the
initiative petition would not be deprived of the right to have their pro-
posal submitted to the electors for their approval.
It is a general doctrine of equitable jurisprudence that a court of
equity is not bound in its relief to the prayer of the petitioner, but rather
that its decree will be formulated so as to do complete equity as to all
the parties affected by the degree.
In the case of Heywood v. Federated Lutheran Benevolent Society
et al.., 29 O.L.Rep. 423 (1927) at page 428, the court in speaking of
remedy by injunction said: "It will be conceded that a court in its
use of this extraordinary power should do so with caution and only after
thoughtful consideration. This remedy should only be applied in clear
cases and in such a manner as to prevent injustice and unnecessary in-
jury." (Italics, the writer's). This foremost principal of equity was
dearly demonstrated by the statement of the court in McMillan v.
Barber dsphalt Paving Co., 151 Wis. 48, 138 N.W. 94 (1912):
"Equity may in all cases so frame its decrees as to make them effective
to do equity, and the forms of equitable relief are as various as the trans-
actions investigated and regulated in equity." A statement of similar
import is set out in Murtha v. Curley, 90 N.Y. 372 (1882): "A court
of equity adopts its relief to the exigencies of the case in hand."
The Court of Appeals of Columbiana County upheld the contention
of the Ohio Power Company that there is no legal authority for the sub-
mission of an initiative petition proposing the purchase or construction of
a municipal power plant to the electors of a municipality.
The authority of a municipality to purchose or construct a power
plant is derived from the provisions of Article XVIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution of Ohio, which states: "Any municipality may acquire,
construct, own, lease, and operate within or without its corporate limits,
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any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be supplied
to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for
any such product or service. . . ." Article XVIII, Section 5, prescribes
the manner in which this authority is to be exercised: "Any municipality
proceeding to acquire, construct, own, lease, or operate a public utility,
or to contract with any person or company therefor, shall act by ordi-
nance-and no such ordinance shall take effect until after thirty days
from its passage. If within said thirty days a petition signed by ten per
centum of the electors of the municipality shall be filed with the execu-
tive authority thereof demanding a referendum on such ordinance it
shall not take effect until submitted to the electors and approved by a
majority of those voting thereon. The submission of any such question
shall be governed by all the provisions of section 8 of this article as to
the submission of the question of choosing a charter commission."
The right of the initiative and referendum is contained in Article
II, Section i-f of the Ohio Constitution which reads as follows: "The
iniative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of
each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now
or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action; such
powers shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by
law.
Standing alone this constitutional provision would bestow the right
to propose the purchase or construction of a municipal power plant by
means of an initiative ordinance. The Court of Appeals in the instant
case declared that this right was precluded by virtue of the provisions of
Article XVIII, Section 5, arguing that "If the proposed ordinance were
submitted and a majority of the electors voted in favor of it, the effective
date of said initiated ordinance would be suspended for a period of thirty
days within which to file a referendum petition, to be submitted to the
electors of said municipality at a special or general election following
said date, which had prior to that time been submitted to the electors
under an initiative petition. Such action in our opinion, would be an
absurdity."
Article XVIII, Section 5, is part and parcel of the Home Rule
Amendment to the Constitution of Ohio as adopted on September 3,
1912. By this amendment municipalities were given a wide range of
powers in carrying on the business of local government. In particular
were they given broad powers in regard to the acquisition or construction
of public utility service systems.
Keeping in mind the fact that Article II, Section 1-f was adopted
at the same time as Article XVIII, Section 5, and that the intent of the
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people in adopting the former 'amendment was to preserve to themselves
the authority to initiate legislation or to review the legislation of their
Councils, it seems unreasonable that they should deprive themselves of
this authority to initiate legislation in regard to one of the most important
rights of municipalities, that of proposing the acquisition or construction
of utility service systems.
That such was not the intent of the people is further suggested by
the fact that a perusal of the Constitutional Debates, the official record
of the Constitutional Convention of 1912, reveals no argument as to
the meaning of Article XVIII, Section 5, while considerable debate
arose in regard to the other provisions dealing with municipal ownership
of utilities.
It is suggested that if the provisions of Article XVIII, Section 5,
were intended to be a limitation on the broad powers bestowed on the
people by Article II, Section i-f, such limitation would have been ex-
pressed in unequivocal terms. Such powers ought not be denied the
people by mere conjecture.
The following principle laid down by the court in State ex rel. v.
Creamer, 83 Ohio St. 412, 94 N.E. 831 (1911), is peculiarly adapt-
able to the facts of the principal case: "The rule that an instrument must
be construed as an entirety applies with even more force to constitutions
than to other instruments."
This principle is stated in more definite language in the case of
Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (913),
where the court in referring to Article V, Section 7, said at page 351:
"It will be remembered that this section and Article XVIII were adopted
as amendments to the constitution on the same day. By that adoption
they became parts and provisions of the same instrument. There are
well established rules by which they must be weighed. They must be
construed together and effect given to them both. Differences, if there
are any, must if possible be reconciled."
The contentions of the defendant in the principal case are supported
by the decision of the court in Goodman v. Hamilton, 21 Ohio App.
465, 153 N.E. 217 (1927). Since the situation presented in that case is
so similar to that of the principal case, it will be well to quote the court's
language at length; at page 468 the court said: "Section 5 of Article
XVIII would be a limitation on the act of Council in enacting an or-
dinance with reference to public utilities, it especially conferring the right
of referendum on an ordinance enacted by Council.
"This view seems to be strengthened by the fact that other sections
of the Constitution give legislative bodies the right to declare emergency
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legislation; but under this section, there could be no emergency with
reference to an ordinance passed authorizing a contract with a public
utility.
"If we give effect to the general provision of the Constitution (re-
ferring to Article II, Section i-f), the authorizing statutes enacted
thereunder, and the special provision relating to ordinances enacted by
Council, the only construction that could be given to the latter would
be that it was a limitation on the powers of Council and did not in any
way effect the rights reserved to the people to initiate an ordinance au-
thorizing a contract." (Italics, the writer's).
Since the Court of Appeals in the principal case issued a decree of
injunction on the basis of the constitutional question raised, and since
the court in Goodman v. Hamilton, (supra) reached a directly opposite
conclusion, it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court of Ohio refused
to pass on that particular question when it held that there was no con-
stitutional question involved.
JAMES R. TRITsCHLER.
POWER OF COURT OF APPEALS TO GRANT REVERSAL ON
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE - JURISDICTION.
The case of Werner v. Rowley, 129 Ohio St. 15, 193 N.E. 623,
I Ohio Op. 303, 16 Abs. 378 (I934), involved an action for personal
injuries. The plaintiff recovered a verdict in the first trial which on
the defendant's motion was set aside as being against the weight of the
evidence. On the second trial of the cause, the plaintiff again received
a verdict to which the defendant objected again on the grounds that it
also was against the weight of the evidence. While the Court of Appeals
considered other errors assigned, it refused to consider the assignment
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and held that by
the cases of Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Trendel, Ioi Ohio St. 316, 128 N.E.
136 (1920), and Rolf v. Heil, II 3 Ohio St. 113, 148 N.E. 398
(1925), it was precluded from so doing. In the Werner case, supra,
the Supreme Court overruled these cases and held Section 11577, Gen-
eral Code, unconstitutional as applicable to the facts of that case.
Although not so stated in the opinion the decision in the Werner case
also overrules Mahoning Valley R.R. Co. v. Santoro, 93 Ohio St. 51,
112 N.E. 190 (i91), which held in effect that when the Court of
Appeals has granted one reversal on the weight of the evidence, it can-
not grant a second reversal on the same ground. The statute provides
that the trial court shall not grant more than one new trial on the
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